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Chapter 4. 
Succession Planning in Polish Family Businesses. 
An Exploratory Investigation  
Aleksander Surdej and Krzysztof Wach  
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Family firms have become a topic of the utmost interest both for academic researchers 
and policy makers. Researchers have started to investigate the distinctiveness of family firms, 
their functioning and efficiency outcomes. Policy makers have been reacting to the problems 
of economic development arising from the domination of family owned and family controlled 
firms in many economies. 
Most of the research projects on the succession process in family firms has been 
conducted in Western countries and there is a lack of understanding of the succession process 
and its determinants in family firms in Central and Eastern Europe, that is why we decided to 
conduct the research survey in Poland1, which seems to be a pioneering project as far as the 
country – Poland – is concerned2. 
The research sample includes 496 family enterprises, among them 85, which 
accomplished the succession process and 147 family firms, which are going to face the 
succession issue. The paper includes research results of the one studied group, that is 
enterprises planning to implement the succession process3.   
 
4.2.  Literature Review 
The succession issue has been identified as one of crucial factors for the functioning 
and growth of family firms. It is reported, what seems like cross-national regularity, that only 
30% of family firms survives in the second generation, while less than 14% functions in third 
generation as still family firms (Fleming, 1997, p. 246; Matthews, Moore, Fialko, 1999, p. 
159).  
                                                 
1 Research project “Succession Scenarios in First Generation of Polish Entrepreneurs” conducted in the years 
2008-2010 by Aleksander Surdej and Krzysztof Wach was financed by Polish Ministry of Science and Higher 
Education (Project no. 1326/B/H03/2008/34).  
2 Currently a large research project is run by the market research firm PENTOR, contracted and funded by Polish 
Agency for Enterprise Development (PARP).  
3 For research results on accomplished succession processes among Polish family businesses see (Surdej and 
Wach, 2009). 
From the theoretical point of view the succession in family firms is related with the 
dilemma how to preserve (and possibly increase) family wealth, while transforming the 
company. Is it better to keep family control over the company, but possibly harm its growth 
perspectives, or rather to transform it by diminishing the family control (or even eliminate it 
altogether). 
Thus, there might be different types of succession. First type might be called a 
defensive succession, in which family tries to preserve the control over enterprise at all costs. 
Second type might be called a transformatory succession,  in which the company is 
transformed so as to maximize the wealth of family even at the cost of reducing the family 
control. 
 It seems that the first type of the succession dominates among SMEs (Micro-, Small 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises) as they operate undiversified business and the firm’s success 
depends very much on the use of idiosyncratic knowledge – tacit and informal knowledge 
which has been acquired over long time and their use is of limited application elsewhere. This 
might explain why small firms try to find the successor among family members, relatives or 
close friends. This explains also why a career path in such small firms is of limited value to 
outsiders. The conjunction of these two factors creates the peculiarity of succession in small 
family firms4. Holmstrom and Milgrom have suggested that this type of family firm can be 
analyzed as a “multi-target unit” (Holmstrom, Milgrom, 1991), whose members contribute to 
the generation of income and profits, but at the same time they are a community of 
organizational and entrepreneurial knowledge, and not the least, of emotional support. Thus, 
in family firms key people are renumerated for all the functions they fulfil. 
But, a different succession is needed when a family firm has grown or has been set to 
grow. A growing firm requires an access to external finance, if external financing comes in 
the form of equity, a firm governing structure has to change in order to accommodate outside 
investors. In addition, such a growing family firm has to hire external managers as it has no 
possibility to fill all posts of responsibility with qualified family members. These remarks 
support the statement that in a context of a family firm’s growth a succession happens most 
likely before the owner founder reaches the age of retirement or physical incapacity. A growth 
oriented family firm will reach the threshold of succession as ownership, management and 
organizational transformation earlier than survival oriented family firms. In such growth 
oriented family firms succession means the introduction of formal rules that reduce the 
                                                 
4 Using the criteria differentiating family firms we see that these firms are characterized by strong overlapping of 
family ownership, management control and involvement in day to day functioning. 
importance of personal relations and the introduction of accounting procedures which would 
increase the transparency of firm’s financial operations to outside investors. A transformatory 
succession leads to the implementation of governance standards which would not differentiate 
family controlled companies from other publicly quoted companies. More, family controlled 
companies, may as it is shown by research of Ashiq Ali, Tai-Yuan Chen and Suresh 
Radhakrishnan (2007) on a sample of family controlled companies quoted at NYSE, perform 
better than non-family controlled companies in terms of the quality of financial reports, 
voluntary disclosure of negative information and voluntary information about internal 
corporate practices. 
Contemporary academic literature converges in a conclusion that businesses often 
begin by taking advantage of small (relatively) networks support,5 and that network 
relationships play a key role in facilitating exchange in developing economies such as sub-
Saharan Africa and that „These relationship differ from pure market exchange in that they 
perform economic functions other than trade itself, such as information sharing, informal 
enforcement of contracts, and interlinking” (Fafchamps, 2004, p. 294). But, the exclusive 
reliance on informal networks limits the efficiency of market exchange and business growth. 
If an institutional environment does not provide formal instruments to substitute for informal 
ones, the economy suffers from unexploited efficiency gains and growth potential. 
Family firms can be analyzed as firms whose foundation and functioning depends on a 
particular network – family. It is a network whose borders are defined by pre-existing bonds 
of kinship – that is why it is closed and its enlargement proceeds by births or marriages. 
Larger similar networks are also traced by pre-existing bonds of tribal or ethnic origins. 
Larger a network is, there is more gains to be achieved from trade or cooperation, but its 
expansion might increase the difficulty in triggering joint action (for instance entering 
exchange, completing transaction). Thus, a factor such as the strenght of family ties might 
which might be productive to initiate a firm, can prove detrimental to its growth. The quality 
of institutional environment seems to act as a factor determining the likelihood with which 
family firms implement growth oriented succession transformation. 
                                                 
5 A study of over 14,000 Mexican small enterprises shows that owners chiefly used their own savings (61%) or 
those of their family and friends (14%) to start their own firms (Hernando-Trillo, Pagan, Paxton, 2005) 
confirming the relevance of what jokingly became known as “the 3F source – meaning Family, Friends and 
Fools”. 
There is a growing amount of economic literature devoted to the relationship between 
institutional factors and economic performance of firms6 and more generally between 
institutions and economic development7. 
Scholars point out many factors influencing the succession process. The institutional 
environment plays an important role in the succession determinants (Surdej, 2009; Wach, 
2009). It is stressed that three variable such as the development of capital markets; the 
minority ownership protection and the legal contracts enforcements, are of special importance 
in this regard. 
The depth and institutional diversity of capital markets broadens the scope of 
succession methods in growth oriented family firms. Thus, for instance, the existence of 
venture capital funds allows family firms to get external financing from sources (financial 
institutions) which monitor them, but do not aspire to management control and it allows to 
draw on their experience in preparing the company for „going public”8. The existance and the 
size of the stock exchange allows a company to „leverage its capital” and to accelerate the 
development9. The data gathered by the World Bank shows that advanced economies are 
characterizied by a higher level of stock market capitalization, which confirms a hypothesis 
that in such countries a family firm can be more easily transformed into a public, but family 
controlled, firm. 
The question of the strength of minority ownership protections is directly related to the 
growth oriented succession. A growing family firm is likely to acquire other (non-family) 
shareholders. By this family ceases to remain the sole owner, but it might remain the majority 
shareholder. But to get an external investor the family has to credibly signal among other that 
it will not get involved in self-dealing and in extracting private benefits of the firm´s control. 
Unless legal regulations reduce the threat of self-dealing, including the extraction of private 
profits through the transaction between related companies, external investors not related to the 
family, will not have trust in investing in them (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, 2008). Although Djankow, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer seem to link the 
strength of anti-self dealing regulations with the legal origin (according to them common law 
                                                 
6 See especially the articles in the Journal of Financial Economics (various issues). 
7 For a useful summary of the current stage of discussion see (Tabellini, 2008). 
8 These are not theoretical possibilities, but solutions implemented in such diverse countries like Poland (Zielona 
Budka – family firm producing ice-creams accepted venture fund financing, reduced its control, went public and 
withdrew from the public quoted company, but Mr. Grycan – the founder of Zielona Budka, started a new ice-
cream producing firm called after his name Grycan, when due period of abstention from competing activities has 
expired – see: J. Cieński, The Ice-Cream King of Poland, in “Financial Times”, 22 July 2009. 
9 Family focused nature of business is perceived as one of principal obstacles facing the private equity financing, 
BUT Private Equity Financing might be ‘help for family members to evolve beyond founders’ [Eid, 2006]. 
countries provide stronger protection than the Continental Europe Law Countries), it seems 
that in general the level of minority owners protection varies with the level of economic 
development and that developing economies are characterized by a weaker minority 
ownership protections regardless of the origin of the inherited law. 
 The recognition of the importance of formal contract enforcement mechanisms comes 
from the observation that many economic transactions are not of instant and simultaneous 
character. A quid happens first and there might be uncertainty about quo. A promise to deliver 
quo needs to be backed by an enforcement mechanism. Subsequent reports of the World 
Bank10 try to measure the quality of enforcing contracts in all countries. The data providing 
by the World Bank point at a positive correlation between the easiness of enforcing contracts 
and the level of country’s economic development: Developed economies (with notable 
exception of Latvia) score better in the ranking of contracts enforcement. 
 
4.3. Methodological Assumptions   
 
 The research was conducted within the project “Succession Scenarios in the First 
Generation of Family Firms in Poland” 11.  
 The main aim of this empirical research was to identify the succession modes of the 
first generation of Polish entrepreneurs. In order to investigate the research problem we have 
conducted the empirical survey and have analysed the collected data in order to identify the 
dominant succession mode in Polish family firms, and to define the determinants of the choice 
of a given succession strategy. 
 
                                                 
10 The series “Doing Business” with the most recent report: Doing Business 2009 by the World Bank. 
11 The research project was conducted at Cracow University of Economics - Faculty of Economics and 
International Relations in the years 2008-2010. The research project was fully financed by the Ministry of 
Science and Higher Education of Poland.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Research Model: Determinants of Succession in Family Firms 
 
Based upon existing literature we have tentatively indicated the following groups of 
determinants which are likely to influence the choice of succession mode (three internal and 
two external forces): 
- structural parameters of an entrepreneur’s family; 
- demographic parameters of the company; 
- individual entrepreneurial history of an owner/founder; 
- parameters of the organizational and legal environment in which a company functions; 
- basic parameters of the sector in which a company functions.  
It can be supposed that these factors determine the choice of the succession mode and the 
choice of the preferred control level of family over the company). Figure 4.1 and table 4.1 
summarize also the factors that determine the choice of succession methods in general. With 
reference to the discussion developed so far it should be stressed that the relative weight of 
factors changes depending on the type of succession. A defensive succession depends much on 
the family’s structural parameters and on intra-family relationships (conflicts, emotions). A 
structural 
parameters 
of a family 
 (F1 - Fn) 
demographic 
parameters 
of an enterprise 
(E1 - En) 
biographical 
parameters 
of an owner 
 (O1 - On) 
legal 
parameters  
(L1 - Ln) 
 
 
family control level 
(C0) 
succession method 
(S0) 
SUCCESSION OF A FAMILY FIRM 
branch 
parameters  
(B1 - Bn) 
 
 
E X T E R N A L S    F A C T O R S 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
transformatory succession depends on the existence of institutional instruments which help to 
solve the conflict between the growth orientation of a firm and the founder/owner interests in 
preserving/increasing family wealth. 
 
Table 4.1. Variables of the Implemented Research Model  
Factors Variables 
structural parameters of a family  - the size of the family 
- generation spread 
- sex of the first child,  
- relationship within the family  
demographic parameters of an enterprise  - age 
- size  
- scope  
- the branch of the industry 
biographical parameters of an owner  - age 
- sex 
- level of education 
- entrepreneurial attitude  
- history of earlier entrepreneurial activities 
branch parameters  -innovativeness level within the branch  
-competitiveness degree within the branch  
legal parameters -rules of corporate governance 
-development of capital markets 
-minority ownership protections 
-legal contracts enforcement  
family control level  -family absolute control 
-family majority control  
-family minority control  
succession method  -passing the family business to the heir 
-selling the whole family business 
-selling the part of the family business 
-quoting on the stock exchange  
 
 
Manager perception was chosen as an operationalization method, thus it assures the 
acceptable correctness and the reliability, and first of all tops other methods in relation to 
practical usage, what is more it is applied in analogous research very often (Lyon, Lumpki, 
Dess, 2000, p. 1055-1085). This method was applied for all qualitative variables. Thus a 
survey (proceeded with a diagnostic pre-survey) was applied as a main investigative 
technique, replenished with technique of observation. Each area was verified by asking from 5 
to 7 questions. For quantitative variables as operationalization method data analysis was 
applied. In support of received and accepted variables the questionnaire of inquiry was 
constructed as a basic investigative tool. Qualitative approach in an inquiry was applied 
mainly, which is the most often applied approach in analogous investigations. Thus, for 
evaluation of variables 5-degree Likert scale with qualitative answers was applied.  
 
4.4. Empirical Findings 
 
Research survey was conducted on a random sample of 496 family enterprises in first 
quarter of 2009 (table 4.2 and figure 4.2). The companies were divided into three groups: 
• 85 family firms which were sold or transferred (17.13%),  
• 147 family firms which plan to face the choice of succession (29.64%), 
• 264 family firms which are not interested in succession planning (53.23%).  
While grouping the studied family businesses, the family structure and history of the research 
sample seems to be quite interesting:  
• 376 studied family firms were initiated by a current owner – so called first generation 
family business (75.80%),  
• 76 studied family firms were initiated by a previous owner – so called second generation 
family business (15.32%), 
• 36 studied family firms are multigenerational with long traditions (7.25%), the oldest one 
was established in 1869. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Basic Characteristics of the sample firms (N = 496) 
Firm Sector:  
Agriculture                      2.22%     (11 cases) 
Manufacturing              13.91%     (69 cases) 
Services and Trade      86.66% (4210 cases) 
 
Business Scope of Operation:  
Local                              36.50% (181 cases) 
Regional                        24.20% (120 cases) 
Domestic                        22.98% (114 cases) 
European                          9.27%  (46 cases) 
International                      6.85%  (34 cases) 
Firm age:  
0 – 5 years                      17.22%   (82 cases) 
6  – 10 years                   17.65%   (84 cases)  
11 and more years          65.12% (310 cases) 
 
Business Legal Form:  
Sole Proprietorship         70.56% (350 cases) 
Unlimited partnership      12.30%  (61 cases) 
Limited partnership           7.46%   (37 cases) 
Limited company               9.07%  (45 cases)  
Others                                0.6%      (3 cases) 
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The level of the family control over the family business is quite interesting (table 4.3). Both, 
at present at after the planning succession, the family absolute or majority share is declared by 
119 family firms, however the percentage of firms declaring the family absolute share is much 
higher at present.  
 
Table 4.3. Level of Family Control Over Family Businesses (N = 147) 
Family Control Level At present After the planning succession 
Family absolute share 112 101 
76.2% 68.7% 
Family majority share  7 18 
4.8% 12.2% 
Family minority share  26 24 
17.7% 16.3% 
No answer 2 4 
1.3% 2.7% 
 
In the studied population there were only three ways of planning succession observed. 
The most popular way of succession is going to be the passing to the heir (95.9% in 141 
cases), other forms of transfer control and ownership were not so popular, among them selling 
the whole business (1.4% in 2 cases) and selling the part of the business share (1.4% in 2 
cases).  
The plans for the forthcoming succession will be prepared – according to responders’ 
declaration - in 76 out of 147 cases (51.7%), which is quite a satisfying figure comparing to 
the accomplished succession research results (Surdej and Wach, 2009), but unfortunately it is 
still a low figure. The number of issues in the forthcoming succession plan differs from 1 to 6 
(1 issue in 33 cases, 2 issues in 29 cases, 3 issues in 4 cases, 4 issues in 8 cases and 6 issues in 
2 cases). 
Considered elements of the forthcoming succession plan are as follows:  
- the identity of the successor in 43 cases (29.25%),  
- the preparation of the successor in 38 cases (25.85%), 
- the division of shares in 29 cases (19.73%), 
- taxation issues in 20 cases (13.60%), 
- sale and purchase of shares in 14 cases (9.52%), 
- external shareholders in 4 cases (2.72%). .  
Only in one fourth of cases the forthcoming successor is going to be a female (versus 
72.1% of male). The younger forthcoming successor within the family will be 20 and the 
oldest will be 52 years old, however only 31.9% of the declared age answers exceed 30 years 
old, which proves that the second generation of Polish enterprises are going to be extremely 
actively involved in currently run family businesses (most of them are currently involved in 
the family firms, both passively and actively).  While planning the succession process, the 
potential successor plays the important role, however almost a one third of the initial founders 
takes only one criterion into consideration, but two criteria are applied by another one third of 
responders (three criteria by 27.21% and five criteria only by 1.36% of responders). In the 
studied firms the following issues are going to be taken into account in the succession 
planning process: 
- family reasons (in 118 out of 147 cases),  
- qualifications of the successor (88 cases),  
- motivation of the successor (65 cases),  
- personal reasons (5 cases) 
- other reasons (7 cases).  
 
4.5. Conclusions and Implications 
 
Ownership and control succession in family firms is a topic of both theoretical and 
empirical interest as it helps to bridge the gap between economics and management sciences. 
Until recently succession in family firms has been predominantly studied by management 
scholars, while family firms efficiency properties has been analyzed by economists. 
Fortunately, more and more scholars try to bridge this divide and, as it has been shown by 
John Roberts in his influential “Modern Firm” (2004), they apply assumptions, approaches 
and models which show an ability to develop a uniform approach to studying social and 
economic phenomena. Succession in family firms is a choice of a model of organization 
transformation with significant implication for the efficiency of markets and modern 
economies. Thus, they share a broader theoretical perspective integrating economic and 
management research.  
The analysis of the succession in family firms should be transformed from a rather 
narrow perspective of identifying, educating and nominating a successor in order to keep the 
control of the firm in the hands of the family to a problem of analyzing succession choices in 
growth oriented companies as such a succession requires a deeper transformation of the 
enterprise organizational structure and corporate practices. 
In our study the sample of 496 family firms was surveyed, but only in 85 cases the 
succession process was found accomplished and in 147 cases the initial founders of family 
businesses are planning the forthcoming succession. The research results allow to formulate 
the following tentative conclusions:  
- The most popular way of succession in the studied group is the passing to the heir 
(95.9%).  
- After 20 years of economic transformation, founders of new enterprises, who are the first 
generation of Polish capitalists, have started to initiate the process of the transfer of 
ownership and/or control over their enterprises. One fourth of the studies firms 
accomplished the succession not earlier than 2 years ago, and the half not earlier than 6 
years ago. 
The research conducted by us has been inspired by theoretical questions. But due to the lack 
of reliable data we could test theoretical hypotheses in the context of transitional economy. 
Instead we have described the important economic phenomenon and have formulated several 
exploratory hypothesis which would guide our future research. 
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